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A TWO-EDGED SWORD:
THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Chi-An Chou
I.INTRODUCTION
As one of the world’s largest economies, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC or China) has garnered international attention over the past
few decades. Neighboring countries in Asia—including Japan, South
Korea, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)—have expressed great interest in forming better trade
relationships with this rising world economic power over the last decade.
Recent economic developments and new trade agreements in the region
demonstrate that trade between China and its neighboring countries
continues to grow. However, despite this regional movement towards
forming closer trade relationships with the PRC, the Republic of China
(ROC or Taiwan), located only about 150 miles off the coast of China
across the Taiwan Strait (Strait), has not developed trade agreements
with the People’s Republic of China.
Historically, the Cross-Strait relationship between the ROC and
PRC has been troubled. In fact, other than the North Korean nuclear
threat, the Taiwan Strait is probably the most hyper-sensitive region in
East Asia with the most potential for triggering serious international
conflict. However, since gaining a new administration in 2008, Taiwan
appears to be more actively seeking stability in the region by forging
greater economic ties and a better trade relationship with the PRC. In
2009, the Taiwanese government made the astonishing announcement
that it intends to make a landmark trade agreement with China. This
agreement will be called the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA).
This Comment will examine the proposed ECFA, as well as its
far-reaching effects on Taiwan. It will first briefly discuss the
relationship between the ROC and PRC, the contents of the ECFA, and
the driving forces behind the signing of the ECFA. Following this
discussion, the Comment will examine the potential benefits and
detriments the ECFA presents to Taiwan. It will identify popular
arguments for and against the ECFA in Taiwan, discuss the merits of
these arguments, and highlight considerations that are not yet included in
this ECFA debate but ought to be. In conclusion, this Comment will
discuss whether the ECFA should be signed and, if so, what provisions
should be included in the ECFA in order to realize the potential benefits
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of the ECFA.
A basic historical knowledge of the relationship between China
and Taiwan is essential to understanding the ECFA and the driving
forces behind its anticipated signing. Since the ROC government
relocated from the Mainland to Taiwan in 1949, China has been divided
into two separate sovereigns: the Republic of China and the People’s
Republic of China.1 The many international debates about which
government actually represented China as a whole caused both sides of
the Strait to hold serious discussions regarding this issue. These
discussions eventually lead to the 1992 Consensus (Consensus), in which
the ROC and PRC agreed that they recognize the existence of only one
China but both sides can interpret its definition of “China” differently.2
This doctrine later became known as the “One China” principle and is
recognized internationally.3 Despite the Consensus and associated efforts
to stabilize the region, repeated Cross-Strait crises, including missile
tests in waters surrounding Taiwan in 1996, demonstrate that distrust and
hostility still exist in the Taiwan Strait.4
Seeing this distrust and hostility as an opportunity, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan adopted a political platform
encouraging Taiwanese localization and independence from China.5 This
apparently patriotic approach to Cross-Strait relations appealed to many
constituents in Taiwan, and the DPP captured the presidential election in
2000 and thereafter slowed Taiwan’s developing trade relationship with
China.6 The DPP remained in power for the next eight years, during
which the Taiwanese government used propaganda to continue building
support for the idea of defending Taiwan’s autonomy by localization and
independence.
Despite the DPP’s efforts to localize Taiwan and stay politically and
economically independent from China, more and more Taiwanese
businesses have transitioned all or part of their operations to China due to
1
Government Information Office, Republic of China, The Republic of China Yearbook,
Chapter 3: History, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ch03.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2010).
2
Government Information Office, Republic of China, The Republic of China Yearbook,
Chapter 7: Cross-Strait Relations, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ch07.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
3
Id.
4
Id; see also, Global Security.org, Taiwan Strait: 21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
5
Minzhu jinbu dang jiben gangling [Democratic Progressive Party Official Website],
http://www.dpp.org.tw/history.php?sub_menu=2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
6
According to statistics put forth by the Bureau of Foreign Trade, trade with China was
generally growing at a slower rate than when the KMT was in power. See
http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSC3/FSC3020F.ASPX (last visited Dec. 02, 2009).
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its lower costs and large market. In fact, more than two million
Taiwanese business persons live in China permanently or semipermanently.7 This number is quite significant because the total
population of Taiwan is only twenty-three million.8 After the Kuo Ming
Tang (KMT) won the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election and regained
political control, the government formed a trade agreement with China
upon consideration of Cross-Strait investments and large-scale business
operations. Serious negotiations with China began in March 2009.9
II. WHAT IS THE ECFA?
The ECFA is essentially an interim free trade agreement (FTA)
between China and Taiwan. When members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), to which both China and Taiwan belong, have
difficulty signing a comprehensive and complete trade agreement, they
often engage in dialogue regarding a general framework agreement.
These agreements allow the countries to manifest determination to
cooperate with each other and effectively set the agenda for future
negotiations.10 These general framework agreements often identify areas
of interest that each side wants included in future negotiations, such as
import-export tariffs, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property, investment
insurance, dispute resolution, quality control, or exit mechanisms.11
Because great political distrust still exists between China and Taiwan,
the ECFA is an appropriate stepping-stone to a more comprehensive and
complete FTA. Under WTO framework, an interim FTA usually
becomes a full FTA in approximately ten years.12
7
Bureau of Foreign Trade, Dalu taishang jingmaowang [Mainland China a Taiwanese
Network], http://cweb.trade.gov.tw/kmi.asp?xdurl=kmif.asp &cat=CAT322 (last visited Dec. 11,
2009).
8
Government Information Office, Republic of China, The Republic of China Yearbook,
Chapter 2: People and Language, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ch2.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
9
Yin qiming zhengshi yi yu duian jiechu tan ECFA [Yin Chi-ming Confirmed That He Had
Contact with the Other Side to Talk About ECFA], CHINA REVIEW NEWS, Mar. 2009,
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/2/7/4/100927425.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100
927425 [hereinafter Yin ch-ming and ECFA].
10
Shenme shi jingji hezuo jiagou xie yi? [What is the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement?], Straits Exch. Found., Mar. 2009,
http://www.seftb.org/mhypage.exe?HYPAGE=/03/03_content_01.asp&weekid=121&idx=2
[hereinafter Strait Exchange Foundation].
11
Id.
12
Yan Huixin, Taiwansig.tw, WTO Guifan yu zhengfu liang an jingmao xieding guihua zhi
yihan [WTO Framework and Government Planning Implications of Cross-Strait Economic and
Trade Agreements], Mar. 2009,
http://www.taiwansig.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1234&Itemid=117
[hereinafter WTO Specification].
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The purposes and effects of the ECFA, as propounded by its
advocates, would help to stabilize and eventually increase Taiwan’s
presence in the Asian market. The former Minister of Economic Affairs,
Yin Chi-min, announced that the ECFA will be geared toward lowering
and eliminating export tariffs, opening the service and investment
industries, and providing protection on Cross-Strait investments.13 The
president of Taiwan, Ma Yingjeou, identified the following three
purposes and effects of the ECFA. First, the ECFA will normalize the
relationship between the two sides of the Strait, providing both the PRC
and the ROC with a framework for trade and investment under which
their businesses can work. Taking sure and incremental steps toward a
level playing field will reassure investors and boost their confidence in
investing. Second, the ECFA will prevent marginalization of Taiwan,
making it easier for Taiwan to make trade agreements with other
countries in the world, particularly ASEAN member states. Third, the
ECFA will further integrate Taiwan with the established system of world
trade.14 Ma Yingjeou also guaranteed that the ECFA would neither
weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty nor allow cheap labor and agricultural
products from the PRC to gain increased access to Taiwan’s market.15
The merits of these claims will be examined later in this Comment.
III. WHAT ARE THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THE ECFA?
The ECFA was originally called the Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement (CECA).16
Although discussion of the CECA did not mature until March of
2009, ECFA had clear and identifiable antecedents: 1) the creation of the
Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation in 2000 by the current
Taiwanese vice-president, Vincent Siew . . . ; 2) the formal accession of
[the People’s Republic of China] and [the Republic of China] to the
World Trade Organization in 2001; and 3) the signing of the China and
13
Yin qi ming： ECFAYin qiming： ECFA zheng jin luo mi gu jinxing lian an tanpan ding
huai ti taiwan zhengqu quanyi [Yin Chi-Ming: ECFA is in Full Swing], TTV NEWS, July 2009,
http://www.ttv.com.tw/news/financeinfo/infoview.asp?newsid=720091550176649RUW0156M3NE
YC9P47QU4WXD58RBADO2YA [hereinafter ECFA is in Full Swing].
14
Mayingjiu:ECFA xian nong jiagou ｢kan lanzi zhuang shenme｣ [Maying jiu: ECFA
Structure Most Important], CAPTIAL, Mar. 2009, https://www.capital.com.tw/News/detial.asp?
pp=12&next1=1&ID=%7BED70FB09-234F-4910-AA3B-42D4CF012248%7D&num=J
[hereinafter ECFA Structure].
15
Id.
16
Terry Cooke, Cross-Strait Matrix: The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,
CHINA BRIEF, May 27, 2009,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35041&tx_ttnews%5
BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=f0b872132a [hereinafter Cross-Strait Matrix].
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Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in June
2003.17
The Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation provided a forum in
which Taiwanese and Chinese businesses could communicate on an
organizational level and identify mutual needs on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait. The accession of Taiwan and China to the WTO also
provided an enforceable framework for future trade arrangements
between the PRC and the ROC. Lastly, the CEPA provided a unique
model for economic cooperation between a country and an independent
economic zone, which may have transferability and could be
implemented between China and Taiwan.18
As the global economy deteriorated, the ECFA concept began to
thrive.19 In mid-February 2009, the Taiwanese National Security
Council’s Secretary General, Su Chi, publicly announced that the
government had decided to sign a Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Arrangement (CECA) with the People’s Republic of
China.20 This grasped the Taiwanese public’s attention immediately, and
many major industry associations expressed support for the initiative.21
President Ma and the Minister of Economic Affairs soon began an active
and comprehensive campaign proposing the concept to the Taiwanese
constituency, while the DPP organized themselves and supporters to
oppose the arrangement.22 The campaign in favor of the CECA presented
the agreement as “‘inevitable’ and a virtual fait accompli, as a process
that could be wrapped up by mid-year, as something that could add
nearly 1.4% to Taiwan’s GDP, and as a boon to Taiwan’s efforts to forge
FTAs with ASEAN, the United States, and others.”23
However, during March and April, public debate spawned by the
Ma administration’s campaign and the DPP’s opposition soon led to
various adjustments to the CECA concept.24 One of these adjustments
was the abandonment of the name CECA, which was thought to be too
reminiscent of China’s CEPA with Hong Kong.25 Given Beijing’s
sovereignty over Hong Kong, the concern was that a “similarly named
trade agreement would erode Taipei’s posture of vigorously contested

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
18
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sovereignty vis-à-vis Beijing.”26 Subsequently, the Ma administration
officially changed the name of CECA to the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement.27
After public campaigning and debates in Taiwan, the former minister
of economic affairs confirmed earlier this year that the Taiwanese
government has been and is still currently in negotiation with the PRC
government.28 In fact, the Ma administration anticipates that the formal
signing of the ECFA will occur sometime in the beginning of 2010.29
Despite efforts by the opposing party and even a call for a referendum by
the DPP, the current situation in Taiwan indicates that the signing should
proceed on schedule.30
IV. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON WHETHER TAIWAN SHOULD SIGN
THE ECFA?
The following Section of this Comment will examine arguments for
signing the ECFA, identify popular reasons for opposing the ECFA,
propose areas for consideration that are not currently discussed in
Taiwan, and suggest that these considerations are indispensable to
understanding the comprehensive effect the ECFA will likely have on
Taiwan’s future.
A. Arguments for the ECFA
Benefits to signing the ECFA, as currently discussed and debated in
Taiwan, can be roughly classified into three main categories: to promote
domestic growth, to prevent marginalization, and to lead to other FTAs.
i. The ECFA will promote domestic growth
The ECFA will encourage growth in Taiwan’s GDP by increasing
Taiwan businesses’ access to China’s low-cost labor force and by
opening Chinese markets to Taiwanese products and services. Taiwan’s
economy relies heavily on its exports. In fact, 63.49% of Taiwan’s 2008
gross national product is attributed to exports to China, Japan, South
Korea, the United States, and other countries.31 Not only is trade a
26

Id.
Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
28
See Yin Chi-ming and ECFA, supra note 9.
29
Jingji bu: fei zhengshi zishang yinggai cha bu duo le [Ministry of Economic Affairs:
Informal Consultations Should be Almost], MSN NEWS, Nov. 2009,
http://news.msn.com.tw/news1475290.aspx.
30
Id.
31
See Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
27
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significant part of Taiwan’s economy, but its trade volume with China,
its biggest trading partner, is also larger than its trading volume with its
next five trading partners combined.32 The government of Taiwan issued
a report early in 2009 through the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)33
estimating that Taiwan’s GDP will rise above 1.3% after signing a CrossStrait economic agreement.34 Currently, there are over 77,000 investment
projects with operations in mainland China.35 Most of these operating
models involve purchasing raw materials from Taiwan or other Asian
markets, assembling the components in the Mainland, and then shipping
finished or semi-finished products to consumers in Japan, the United
States, and other major markets around the world.36 Under this model,
Chinese factories rely on Taiwanese businesses’ more advanced
technology while Taiwanese businesses rely on China’s cheap labor
force; together, they feed off the U.S. market. Therefore, Taiwanese
businesses stand to benefit from the ECFA because reducing importexport tariffs would allow Taiwanese businesses to take greater
advantage of the labor market in China and produce goods at a
competitive price.
President Kuo Jinrong of the Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers
Association recently illustrated the need for and benefits of the ECFA for
his industry. Since Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001, allowing Chinese
manufactured shoes to be sold in Taiwan, more than 100,000 workers in
the footwear industry have been directly and negatively affected by the
fierce competition.37 In an interview, Kuo suggested that because the
Taiwanese government consequently imposed anti-dumping tariffs on
Chinese shoes, Taiwanese manufacturers have barely been able to
compete with Chinese shoe-makers for the last five years.38 However,
2009 marks the last year this anti-dumping tax is allowed under WTO
32

Bureau of Foreign Trade, Republic of China, Republic of China Import and Export
Countries, http://cweb.trade.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1 (last visted Nov. 30, 2009).
33
The Strait Exchange Foundation is a semi-official organization set up by the Taiwan
government to deal with trading and business matters with the People’s Republic of China. Although
the SEF is technically a private entity, it is founded by the government and controlled by the
Executive Yuan. Often, it acts as a liaison in handing Cross-Strait matters. See www.sef.org.tw.
34
Yin Chi-ming: qian ECFA tai GDP jiang zeng 1.374% [Yin Chi-Ming: Confirms ECFA
will Increase Taiwan’s GDP 1.374％], CHINA REVIEW NEWS, Mar. 2009,
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/2/7/3/100927349.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100
927349 [hereinafter ECFA Taiwan’s GDP].
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See Ta wan jin jibu: ECFA ruoshi chanye jiang you huanchong qi [Taiwan’s Ministry of
Economic Affairs: ECFA will have a Grace Period for Weak Industries], CHINA REVIEW NEWS,
Mar. 2009,
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/1/8/9/100918981.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100
918981 [hereinafter ECFA Grace Period].
38
Id.
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rules. Kuo further stated that without signing the ECFA, Taiwanese
workers will not be able to level the playing field.39
In addition, signing the ECFA will likely ensure Taiwan’s access to
the Chinese market. Former Minister of Economic Affairs Yin (Yin)
asserted that one of the reasons the economic crisis of 2009 had such an
adverse effect on Taiwan’s economy is Taiwan’s over-reliance on the
U.S. market.40 As a result of the economic crisis in the United States,
U.S. demand for Taiwanese goods decreased. Because Taiwan had no
alternative markets, Taiwanese companies were unable to sell their
products. With its 1.3 billion population and an increasing GDP per
capita, China can provide a viable alternative market to Taiwanese
businesses. Former minister Yin also points to the petroleum, machinery,
and auto parts industries as primary beneficiaries of the opportunities
promised by the ECFA.41
ii. The ECFA will prevent marginalization
Another promising benefit of signing the ECFA is to avoid
marginalization in a rapidly changing Asian economy. On January 1,
2010, ASEAN officially entered into a free trade relationship with China,
known as “ASEAN Plus One” (ASEAN+1).42 This new economic free
trade zone includes a population of nearly two billion people.43 With this
new relationship, China has eliminated 90% of import tariffs with
Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
The other 10% of the import tariffs will be eliminated gradually because
they deal with industries that are highly sensitive, such as textile and
electronics. The rest of the ASEAN member countries will enjoy the
same privilege as soon as 2015.44 In addition, ASEAN also has plans to
construct free trade arrangements with Japan and South Korea. Along
with its free trade with China, this arrangement is known as “ASEAN
39

Id.
Yin Chi-ming: ECFA ru sun zhuquan bu qian [Yin Chi-ming: Signing ECFA Will Not
Lead to Loss of Sovereignty], UNITED DAILY NEWS, July 2009,
http://www.udn.com/2009/7/31/NEWS/NATIONAL/BREAKINGNEWS1/5051478.shtml
[hereinafter ECFA Sovereignty].
41
See ECFA Taiwan’s GDP, supra note 34.
42
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations includes ten member countries: Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam. See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Overview,
http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html (stating that ASEAN was established in 1967 with the
purpose of accelerating economic growth and social progress in the region).
43
See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Country Statistics, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/22122.htm (last visited, Apr. 15, 2010).
44
Dongxie jia yi chengli di xingsi [Implications of ASEAN Plus One], Nat’l Policy Found.,
Feb. 2010, http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/6916.
40
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Plus Three” (ASEAN+3).45
The ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN + 3 arrangements prevent Taiwan’s
businesses from competing effectively in the Asian market, causing its
eventual marginalization in the region. In 2010, while most ASEAN
goods gain tariff-free access to the Chinese market, most Taiwanese
imports into China will still be subject to a 6–14% tariff.46 Consequently,
Taiwanese businesses will be forced to leave China and invest elsewhere
to avoid this disadvantage. If allowed to snowball, this problem would
hollow out Taiwanese industries and severely damage Taiwan’s
competitiveness. With decreased capacity, Taiwan will no longer play an
important role in the Asian economy, and will appear as “the wallflower
in China’s dance with regional trade partners.”47 Making matters worse,
South Korea, one of the “Plus Three” countries, also has an export-heavy
economy and has become Taiwan’s biggest competitor in recent years.48
Thus, if Taiwan cannot effectively reduce its costs, its role in the Asian
economy may be slowly replaced by an ambitious South Korea, which
enjoys open access to China and ASEAN member countries. On the
other hand, if Taiwan does successfully negotiate the ECFA and
therefore levels the playing field, studies show that foreign investments
in Taiwan can increase from 29–42%.49 Should Taiwan also manage to
negotiate free trade arrangements with ASEAN, its foreign and domestic
investments are projected to increase another 23–37%.50
iii. The ECFA may lead to signing FTAs with other countries
The ECFA will also make signing FTAs with other countries
possible. In the past, Taiwan had strategically focused on signing FTAs
with the United States, Japan, Singapore, and the European Union in an
attempt to offset efforts from the PRC to marginalize Taiwan.51 All of
these attempts failed, however, due in large part to Beijing’s strong
opposition as well as the unwillingness of these countries to take sides in
a stressed Cross-Strait relationship.52 Although Taiwan officially joined
the WTO in 2001, Taiwan’s abnormal relationship with China, and
45

ECFA Taiwan’s GDP, supra note 34.
See www.sef.org.tw.
47
Cross-Strait Matrix, supra note 16.
48
ECFA Grace Period, supra note 37.
49
Liangan jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi Q&A [Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement Q&A], Apr. 2009,
http://ekm92.trade.gov.tw/BOFT/web/report_detail.jsp?data_base_id=DB009&
category_id=CAT4010&report_id=167668 [hereinafter Cross-Strait ECFA Q A].
50
Id.
51
Cross-Strait Matrix, supra note 16; see also Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
52
Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
46

＆
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China’s recent domination in the world economy deter other countries
from entering into free trade agreement with Taiwan.53
Given the right conditions, however, signing FTAs with other
countries in the future is not completely inconceivable for Taiwan. In
fact, the government of Taiwan has suggested that signing the ECFA
with China may be just what is needed for Taiwan to negotiate more free
trade relationships with other nations.54 The American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT) indicates that signing a FTA with the United States is
unlikely until Taiwan has solidified and clarified its trade relationship
with China.55 Although there have been no express guarantees that
signing the ECFA will lead to an FTA with the United States, many
understand AIT’s statement to imply that an agreement like the ECFA
would greatly increase the likelihood of such an agreement with the
United States.
Signing the ECFA may also lead to more free trade with ASEAN
member countries. The ASEAN Charter declares that it will be “mindful
of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among [its]
peoples and member states”, and its purpose is to “maintain peace,
security, and stability . . . in the region.”56 Its behavior in the past has
shown that ASEAN traditionally upholds these purposes and standards
by “following the path of least resistance” in developing trade
relationships with other countries. In fact, Surin Pitsuwan, former
ASEAN Chairman, has reported that ASEAN will not initiate economic
cooperation with both sides of the Strait until both Taiwan and China
reach a certain level of consensus as to its trade relationships.57 Since
Taiwan commenced serious talks with China concerning the ECFA,
former minister Yin has observed that quite a few ASEAN member
countries have expressed willingness to consider free trade negotiations
with Taiwan if Taiwan were able to reach a formal trade agreement with
China first.58
Domestic growth, prevention of marginalization, and initiation of
other FTAs are the main benefits that Taiwan believes will come from
the ECFA. While the government is actively educating the people about
these benefits, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the opposition
party in Taiwan, and other pro-independence parties are also advancing
53

Cross-Strait Matrix, supra note 16.
Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
Cross-Strait Matrix, supra note 16.
56
The ASEAN Charter pmbl, art. 1, para 1, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
57
Strait Exchange Foundation, supra note 10.
58
ECFA Grace Period, supra note 37.
54
55

10

SPRING 2010

A Two-Edged Sword

arguments against the ECFA, including: a weakening of Taiwan’s
sovereignty, a threat of stiff foreign competition to Taiwanese laborers
and farmers, and overdependence on China. While these popular
arguments against the ECFA are not completely without merit, this
Comment will offer reasons they are unpersuasive. Following this
discussion, this Comment will provide other points of consideration
which are critical in evaluating the actual economic consequences of
signing the ECFA.
B. Popular Arguments Against the ECFA
The campaign against ECFA coalesces into three popular arguments:
(1) the ECFA will undermine the autonomy of Taiwan, (2) Chinese
access to Taiwan markets will threaten Taiwanese laborer and farmer
employment, and (3) signing the ECFA will lead to overdependence on
Chinese markets as a purchaser of Taiwanese goods. None of these
arguments are strong, however, and are perpetuated largely through
continued fear and misunderstanding of the ECFA.
i. The ECFA undermines Taiwan’s autonomy
Currently, the most common argument against signing the ECFA in
Taiwan is that the ECFA will undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. This
theory is primarily advanced by the DPP, who contends that, should
Taiwan sign the ECFA under the One-China principle, Taiwan will lose
its economic independence and autonomy, thereby experiencing a
detrimental impact.”59
The DPP points to the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) signed between China and Hong Kong as proof that
signing the ECFA will eventually lead to two separate tariff zones
operating under the scope of one People’s Republic of China.60 The
CEPA was signed in 2003 in an effort to stimulate Hong Kong’s
economy and promote trade with the Mainland.61 After reunification with
the Mainland in 1997, Hong Kong was promised economic autonomy for
fifty years without interference from the Mainland.62 Although Hong
Kong was able to largely maintain its economic and even political
independence after reunification, it sensed the need to establish a closer
59
Fandui ECFA Jiu da liyou [Nine Arguments Against ECFA], Jun. 2009,
http://green.csie.ntu.edu.tw/news20090609.htm [hereinafter ECFA Opposition].
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Information Services Department, Hong Kong SAR Government, Hong Kong Yearbook,
Chapter 21: History, 419, http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2008/en/pdf/E21.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
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economic relationship with China and therefore signed the CEPA six
years later. Notably, the CEPA was premised on the notion that it would
be carried out in accordance with the “One Country, Two Systems”
doctrine required by the rules of the WTO.63 Hu Jintao, General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, has alluded to the CEPA
model as a possible mechanism under which the ECFA could be carried
out.64 Many Taiwanese pro-independence politicians, most of whom are
DPP members, have interpreted Hu’s statement as China’s scheme to
legally treat Taiwan like Hong Kong and create a “One-China
economy.”65 Opponents of the ECFA suggest that once the ECFA is
signed, Taiwan’s economy will have to operate under this One-China
economy, and consequently lose its right and ability to make its own
trading policies and maintain economic independence. This, in turn, will
slowly deplete its political autonomy.
The effect of this suspicion is manifested in the evolution of the
actual name of the ECFA. The Taiwanese government, in its early
considerations of an economic agreement with China, intended to call the
agreement the “Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement.” However,
when the DPP asserted that this agreement would subject Taiwanese
sovereignty to China’s rule, the government changed the name to
“Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement” (CECA).66
Nevertheless, the DPP continued to criticize this CECA as being too
similar to the CEPA between Hong Kong and China.67 After several
months, the Taiwanese government again changed the name to avoid
further controversies and forestall confusion of the ECFA with the
CEPA, this time to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.68
While the effect of this DPP-promulgated theory on Taiwan’s
constituents is self-evident, the reasonableness of the underlying theory
is not. The CEPA is a signed agreement between the central government
of a state and a special tariff and economic zone of the same state. There
63
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was no question at the creation and signing of the CEPA that Hong Kong
was then a part of China. Thus, the CEPA had no reason to contemplate
any framework for economic cooperation other than the “One China,
Two Systems” structure. The ECFA, on the other hand, will be signed
between Taiwan and China—two practically separate states with a
delicately abnormal relationship of hostility and interdependence. There
is no reason to assume the ECFA will require a framework of
cooperation that will diminish Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, Taipei has
indicated that the ECFA will be a purely economic agreement and carry
no political implications.69 In addition, President Ma Yingjeo of Taiwan
has repeatedly promised that the ECFA will not be signed if Taiwanese
sovereignty will be compromised in any way.70
ii. The ECFA threatens Taiwanese farmers and laborers
The second popular argument against the ECFA is a general
protectionist theory put forth by the DPP. This theory suggests that
should Taiwan sign the ECFA, over four million people, mainly laborers
and farmers, would be directly affected.71 The basic reasoning behind
this theory is provided by the supply-demand model often seen in
economics. Under this theory, if the ECFA is signed, it would open the
flood gates and allow Chinese laborers free entrance into Taiwan’s
market. As the supply of workers increased, the cost of finding workers
would decrease, and Taiwanese workers and farmers would have a more
difficult time competing in the market.72 In addition, an increase in
Cross-Strait business opportunities would facilitate the transfer of
Taiwanese business operations to the Mainland where employers could
take advantage of the lower standard of living and cost of labor. If these
businesses moved to China, not only would the number of employers in
Taiwan decrease, but there would also be an influx of cheap Chinese
laborers. This series of events would result in disaster for Taiwanese
workers.
While this argument appears sound in theory, proponents of this
argument seem to intentionally avoid facts that might calm fears
69
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70
ECFA Structure, supra note 14.
71
Mínjin dang xuancheng ECFA chongji 4,000,000 ren shengji [DPP Claims That EFCA
Will Impact Livelihoods of 4 Million],CHINA REVIEW NEWS, Mar. 2009,
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/
1009/2/3/3/100923334.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100923334.
72
One-China Economy, supra note 65.

13

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

regarding excessive Chinese laborers in the Taiwanese market. First, the
Taiwanese economy is heavily export–oriented: approximately 60–70%
of Taiwan’s total GDP is directly related to exportation.73 Many of these
exportation businesses already have factories in China employing
Chinese workers. Thus, the Taiwanese labor market is already near
saturation and workers are already earning only marginal profits for their
labors. Under these conditions, Chinese laborers are unlikely to migrate
to a Taiwanese market where the prospect of earning a profit is low
while the cost of living is high.
Second, the government of Taiwan has already accounted for the
risks of increased Chinese laborers in Taiwan. In early 2009, President
Ma, in light of this concern, publicly promised that the ECFA will not
open the Taiwanese market and allow Chinese laborers and farmers easy
access into Taiwan.74 In addition, for industries that are especially labor
intensive, such as the textile industry, the government promised to
include in its negotiations with China provisions protecting these
industries and their workers.75
iii. The ECFA could result in overdependence on China
Finally, some argue that signing the ECFA would lead to Taiwan’s
overdependence on the Chinese market. This argument is based on the
fact that 80% of Taiwan’s foreign investments are located in China and
40% of Taiwan’s exported goods end up in China.76 According to data
provided by the Council for Economic Planning and Development,
R.O.C., Taiwan’s exports decreased by 58.6% in the first quarter of
2009.77 Opponents to the ECFA point to this data and suggest that
Taiwan’s economy already depends so heavily on China’s consumption
that if the ECFA is signed it will only increase this dependence on
Chinese demand.78 Opponents of the ECFA also assert that currently,
Taishangs and Taiwanese businesses enjoy a competitive edge over
Chinese businesses because of their advanced technology and expertise.
Once the ECFA opens the Cross-Strait market, these technologies will be
learned by Chinese businesses and Taishangs will lose their competitive
73
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advantage.79 As a result, Taiwanese businesses’ advantages will slowly
be marginalized and the businesses will increasingly engage in price
wars with Chinese businesses in order to survive in China. Over time,
this would lead to an inability to effectively compete at a global level,
and force Taiwanese businesses to stay in China and rely on its market.80
Although the phenomenon described above is conceivable, it is not
inevitable. First, using the data from the first quarter of 2009 to suggest
that overdependence on the Chinese market has caused Taiwan’s
exportation decline is misleading. Even if Taiwan’s exportation is
completely independent from China’s market, the global financial crisis
of 2009 likely had a comparable, if not worse, effect on Taiwan’s
exportation figures. In addition, although Taiwan’s exportation suffered a
serious setback in the first quarter of 2009 (a 58% decrease), its overall
export for the year only decreased by 20% as compared to 2008.81
Considering China’s strong performance relative to other countries in the
world in 2009, one may wonder whether Taiwan’s trading would have
bounced back if it had not had more access to the Chinese market.
In addition, although the ECFA will open the Cross-Strait market
and therefore expose more of Taiwan’s technology to Chinese
businesses, Taiwanese companies will likely enjoy that same privilege
and tap into technologies developed by the Chinese, as well as
technologies developed by countries throughout the world with
investments and projects in China. Considering the expertise and
international experience developed in the past three decades, it is not
hard to imagine that Taiwanese businesses can combine their skills with
what is learned in China and thereby stay competitive in the world
economy.
V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THE EVALUATION OF THE ECFA
Although the aforementioned arguments against signing the ECFA
are not entirely without merit, they should not be the focal point in the
ECFA debate. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that these
arguments capitalize on Taiwanese constituents’ fear of involuntary
reunification with China and their desire to maintain autonomy. Some of
the aforementioned arguments therefore only superficially address
possible consequences of signing the ECFA.
79

Id.
Id.
81
Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, Woguo dui zhuyao guojia (diqu) chukou zongzhi
ji nian zeng lu [China's Major Countries (Regions) and the Annual Growth Rate of Exports],
http://www.mof.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem =55233&ctNode=1774&mp=6 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
80

15

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

This Comment will now advance considerations that address
material economic consequences of signing the ECFA. The first of these
considerations is whether there will be actual harm to Taiwan’s domestic
market and whether the degree and extent of this harm can be accurately
evaluated. If not, Taiwan is taking a risk in signing the ECFA. The
second consideration is whether the ECFA can achieve its proposed
result of sufficient tariff reduction and lead to signing FTAs with other
countries. These considerations—as opposed to the ones discussed
above—are the considerations that should temper an over-optimistic
attitude about signing the ECFA.
A.

Negative Consequences of the ECFA to Taiwanese Domestic
Markets Are Difficult to Evaluate

Although signing the ECFA may greatly benefit Taiwanese
businesses, it could also harm the Taiwanese market. In mid-2009 the
Taiwanese government reported that the ECFA will likely create 12,000–
26,000 job opportunities while only eliminating 8,000–10,000 jobs.82 As
will be explained, such an estimate is likely to be incomplete or
misleading as it focuses only on data associated with tariff reductions. In
addition, the ECFA may cause an industrial hollow out in Taiwan.
Although it is difficult to predict the exact consequences of a hollow out
in Taiwan, it is clear that there will be fewer job opportunities.
As mentioned previously, the problem with the 8,000–10,000 job
loss estimate is that it ignores the overall effect of the ECFA. Former
Minister Yin has described the ECFA as an egg with three yolks:
reducing tariffs, opening service industries, and increasing Cross-Strait
investment opportunities.83 Although all three objectives are integral
parts of the ECFA, the model used by the government to calculate job
losses, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), only processes data
associated with tariff reduction.84 Therefore, the number of job losses
estimated by the government can be interpreted as job losses due to the
effects of tariff reduction only. The resulting miscalculation of job losses
would have a disproportionate effect on small and medium sized
businesses. Many of these businesses provide services to the domestic
market. Although exportation makes up 60% of Taiwan’s total GDP,
almost 70% of Taiwan’s businesses are service-oriented and primarily
82
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serve the domestic population.85 Of these service providers, most are
retailers, wholesalers, food industries, and lodging industries operating
on a small scale and often run by family members.86 If the ECFA opens
the Taiwanese market to the Chinese, the Chinese will likely encounter
very few barriers to entry into Taiwanese markets, as the cost of capital
to set up service-oriented operations is low, and the culture and language
between China and Taiwan are similar enough that doing business in
Taiwan will not be difficult. Although this may also present
opportunities to Taiwanese business persons, it is important to remember
that these service industries currently provide over 20% of employment
opportunities available in Taiwan.87 Therefore, any underestimation on
the predicted number of job losses advanced by the government will
have disastrous consequences for the service sector of the Taiwanese
labor market.
In addition to its inability to take into account the effects of
opening service industries and Cross-Strait investments, the GTAP
model confines its predictions only to a short period of time following
the signing of the ECFA. In a report generated by the Bureau of Foreign
Trade, the government explained that the GTAP model assumes that
there will be no price adjustments after the signing of the ECFA and that
Cross-Strait competition will be limited to a competition in price but not
in quality.88 With these assumptions in place, the government’s
prediction of 8,000–10,000 job losses is at best only a short-term
evaluation of the effects that tariff reduction may have on Taiwanese
unemployment.
The ECFA may also harm Taiwan’s domestic market by causing
industrial hollow outs in Taiwan. This hollow out effect has been largely
overlooked. Industrial hollow out may take two forms. The first of these
is foreign acquisition of Taiwanese enterprises. For example, Taiwan
currently has very large international semiconductor and integrated
circuit (IC) companies that supply global demands. These Taiwanese
companies are currently much more competitive than their Chinese
counterparts because of their advanced technology in design and
application. Their clients are often large international corporations based
in the United States or Europe. If the ECFA opens the market for these
85
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Taiwanese companies, not only will they have a share of the Chinese
market, but they will also have the opportunity to establish the
foundation for the IC and semiconductor industries in China. As these
companies move into China, learn the Chinese market, and form close
ties with other Chinese industries, their value and appeal to their foreign
clients will increase dramatically. Once Taiwanese companies are well
established in China and the Chinese semiconductor and IC markets
mature, foreign clients could consider buying these Taiwanese
companies. These potential buyers will have no use for Taiwanese
companies as middlemen and will have no incentive to share profits with
them. On the contrary, they would have increased incentives to buy out
the Taiwanese companies and save on costs. If this happens, the
predicted employment opportunities for Taiwanese employees will be
undercut.
A second way industrial hollow outs may occur is if smaller
businesses leave Taiwan after losing to Chinese competition. Certain
industries in Taiwan are composed of one dominant corporation with
smaller enterprises. For example, China Steel is the largest steel maker in
Taiwan, owning half of the Taiwanese market. The rest of the market
consists of many other smaller companies, none of which compares to
China Steel in scale or influence.89 The ECFA will likely not have an
adverse effect on China Steel due to its size and well-established position
in the Taiwanese market. However, if the other smaller steel companies
lose out to the Chinese competition, they will likely move their
operations somewhere cheaper, perhaps to China or ASEAN member
countries. This is most likely to occur in industries that once consisted of
a few state-owned enterprises, like the steel and petroleum industries. If
this small business glut actually occurs, employment opportunities within
these smaller companies will diminish.
Despite the predictions made and the arguments discredited above, it
is extremely difficult to calculate the effects of an industrial hollow out
in Taiwan. Whether the hollow out is caused by foreign acquisitions of
Taiwanese companies or Taiwanese companies leaving the market, the
GTAP does not accurately process the effects of a possible hollow out.
Consequently, the Taiwanese government has not yet provided any data
on possible effects of industrial hollow out and has thus underestimated
the effect the signing of the ECFA could have on employment
opportunities for Taiwanese laborers.
89
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A Two-Edged Sword
The ECFA May Not Achieve All of Its Objectives

In addition to considering unexpected harms caused by the ECFA,
its effectiveness in achieving its proposed results should also be
examined. Some propose that the ECFA will increase free trade and
reduce, if not eliminate, tariffs.90 The Taiwanese government also
suggests that signing the ECFA will lead to signing FTAs with other
nations.91 However, the likelihood that the ECFA will actually achieve
both of these objectives is questionable.
The ECFA may fail to increase free trade and reduce tariffs if a
finalized FTA is not established under the WTO framework. The most
significant benefit that will purportedly result from signing the ECFA is
promoting Cross-Strait trade by reducing and eliminating tariffs while
protecting infant or labor-sensitive industries.92 This will only occur if it
is so determined under a finalized FTA. Under the WTO framework, the
ECFA will probably be considered an interim FTA. Interim FTAs
usually become fully developed FTAs within ten years under this WTO
framework.93 However, FTAs are normally signed between two
independent states. Since, under the WTO’s “One China” principle, the
ECFA technically governs only one state, the fact that the ECFA
resembles other interim FTAs does not guarantee that a complete FTA
will develop within ten years. In addition, even assuming that the ECFA
will lead to a FTA with China, the actual terms of the final agreement
may not necessarily benefit Taiwan as much as Taiwan hopes. Lastly,
since the beginning of 2009, Taiwan has repeatedly conveyed to its
populous that Taiwan must sign the ECFA with China and Taiwan will
do all that is necessary to ensure that the ECFA is signed by 2010.94
When one party to a negotiation has already revealed its bottom line, as
Taiwan has done here, that party leaves itself little bargaining power and
leverage at the negotiation table. Thus, Taiwan will have little power to
ensure that a final FTA, if one does develop, will be abundantly
favorable to Taiwan.
In addition to eliminating or reducing tariffs, another projected
benefit of signing the ECFA is that it will lead to signing other FTAs
with other nations; however, this is not certain. Although China has not
indicated whether it will encourage or allow Taiwan to sign FTAs with
other countries after signing the ECFA, the reasons China previously
90
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opposed Taiwan signing FTAs with other countries still exist. The PRC
has indicated that the ECFA is purely an economic agreement.95 If the
ECFA carries no political implications, the difficulties in signing FTAs
with other countries that currently challenge Taiwan will still exist after
the ECFA is signed. Former minister Yin stated that Taiwan has had
difficulties signing FTAs with other countries primarily because of
China’s opposition.96 Because China sees Taiwan as a part of its
territory, it will consistently object to Taiwan making trade agreements
with other states. Although signing the ECFA means further Cross-Strait
trading and economic cooperation, it does not mean that China has or
will change its perception and interpretation of the “One China”
principle. Therefore, it is dangerous to assume that just because Taiwan
will now sign a framework agreement with China, China will suddenly
let Taiwan sign FTAs with other nations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment is not to reject signing the ECFA,
but rather to scrutinize unfounded existing fears surrounding the signing
and provide additional considerations that caution against an overoptimistic attitude towards the ECFA. Having potentially negative
impacts on Taiwan’s domestic market does not automatically discount
the potential benefits the ECFA can bring. Indeed, every FTA carries
potential costs in addition to its benefits. The ECFA does present many
opportunities to Taiwanese businesses. However, just as the actual harms
to Taiwan are hard to predict, the long-term benefits of the ECFA are just
as murky. Furthermore, while the ECFA presents a few uncertainties
about Taiwan’s future, the effect of not signing the ECFA will certainly
harm Taiwan’s ability to compete in the Asian economy. In addition,
considering President Ma’s recent statement that signing the ECFA is
imminent and certain,97 whether the ECFA should be signed may not be
as important of an issue as how the ECFA will actually be framed and
negotiated. If, during the actual negotiations of the ECFA, provisions
may be included that prevent Taiwanese industrial hollow out and
guarantee the freedom to sign FTAs with other states, the ECFA’s
proposed benefits to Taiwan will be more likely to materialize.
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